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the activity of the mind is largely sub-conscious, all that appears in clear consciousness being the words which are used as symbols.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

The Conception of God. A Philosophical Discussion concerning the Nature of the Divine Idea as a Demonstrable Reality. By JOSIAH ROYCE, Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University, JOSEPH LE CONTE and G. H. HOWISON, Professors in the University of California, and SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Texas. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co., 1897.—pp. xxxviii, 354.

Although this discussion was noticed on its first appearance in pamphlet form (PHIL. REV., V, p. 213), its present republication calls for some further remark. The first part of the volume preserves the form as well as the substance of the original discussion, including Professor Royce's address on "The Conception of God" and critical papers, by Professors Mezes, Le Conte and Howison, respectively, on "Worth and Goodness as Marks of the Absolute," "God and connected Problems, in the light of Evolution," and "The City of God, and the true God as its Head." To these essays there is now added a "Supplementary Essay" by Professor Royce, on "The Absolute and the Individual," in which he seeks to develop his idealistic principle in such a way as to demonstrate its inclusion of the moral individual, and thus to save his philosophy from the main criticism of Professor Howison, as well as from the objections offered by the other contributors to the symposium.

Professor Royce's original paper proceeds on essentially the same lines as those followed in his earlier work, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, the chief variation being that, in describing the life of the Absolute, he here follows Mr. Bradley's example, and substitutes the term 'experience' for 'knowledge.' In fact, the essay is hardly more than a restatement, in brief and telling phrase, of Mr. Bradley's argument in *Appearance and Reality*. Like that argument, and like Professor Royce's own earlier statement, it moves on intellectual rather than on ethical lines, and invites criticism from the ethical point of view.

This criticism the argument received in unmistakable and effective terms from Professor Howison, who, as editor of this volume, has the advantage of the last word, and uses it to state the main issue in the following way. The question is, whether Professor Royce's conception of God "is compatible with that autonomy of moral action which

mankind in its fully enlightened civilization, and especially under the Christian consciousness, has come to appreciate as the vital principle of all personality" (p. xi). "Here," Professor Howison maintains, "there is a chasm, incapable of closure, between the immanence of God, even as Professor Royce conceives it, and the real personality, the moral autonomy, of created minds." Professor Royce, in rejoinder, contends that there is no such chasm, that a divine Self-Consciousness continuously inclusive of our consciousness is demanded if a knowable God is to be proved, and that its existence is not only compatible with the existence of included conscious selves, but "directly provides for them, imparts to them as its own members its own freedom, and thus gives them all the autonomy permissible in a world that is moral" (p. xii). In his Supplementary Essay Professor Royce seeks, by "a systematic investigation of the nature and source of Individuation," to show how personality, conceived as self-conscious individuality, flows directly and even solely from his conception of God, when the essential implications of this are developed. Here Professor Howison's contention is that this theory of the person, making the single self nothing but at an *identical part* of the unifying Divine Will (as Professor Royce is explicit in declaring), gives to the created soul no freedom at all of its own; that the moral individual, the person, cannot with truth be thus confounded with the logical singular; and that personality, as reached by this doctrine, is so truncated as to cease being true personality (p. xiii).

Otherwise stated, the issue is the well-known one between monism and pluralism. "Only it is of essential importance to add that both parties interpret their views in terms of idealism. To both alike, all reality at last comes back to the reality of Mind; to the primary reality of self-consciousness, and the derivative reality of 'things,' or objects ordinarily so called, as real items in such self-consciousness. The difference is, as to whether there really are many minds, or, in the last resort, there is only one Mind; whether the Absolute Reality is a system of self-active beings forming a Unity, or is after all, with whatever included variety, a continuous Unit; whether it is a free Harmony, or, as Professor James satirically calls it, a 'solid block'" (pp. xiv, xv). The one view might be called idealistic monism, the other pluralistic or ethical idealism. Professor Howison prefers to describe the latter view as 'personal idealism,' since "all other forms of idealism are," as he thinks, "in the last analysis non-personal—are unable to achieve the reality of any genuine Person" (p. xv).

The fault of idealistic monism, in the eyes of Professor Howison,

is, that it is not absolute idealism at all: "its exact fault is not waiting for thought to take the fruitful round of its entire Ideal before declaring its equivalence to the Real" (p. 89). Its advocates "have not seized nor expressed the complete *Ideal of the Reason*." It is the expression of oriental pantheism, rather than of western theism. If we would reach the theistic position, there must be "no confusion of the creature with the Creator, nor any interfusion of the Creator with the creature. Above all, we must attain to the *moral* reality of the creature, which means his self-determining freedom of not merely with reference to the world of sense, but also with reference to the Creator, and must therefore include his imperishable existence" (p. 98). The 'self-completeness' of God, reached by Professor Royce, is incompatible with goodness. "Such self-completeness fails to provide for any manifold of selves either phenomenal or noumenal, and the very meaning of goodness, if goodness is moral, depends on the reality of such a public of selves" (p. 105). The fault of Professor Royce's conception of God "at the bar of the religious reason is, that by force of the argument leading to it all the turmoil and all the contradictions and tragic discords belonging to experience must be taken up directly into the life of the Absolute; they are *his* experience as well as ours, and must be left in him at once both dissolved and undissolved, unharmonized as well as harmonized, stilled and yet raging, atoned for and yet all unatoned. Contradiction is thus not only introduced into the very being of the Eternal, and left there, but its dialectic back-and-forth throb is made the very quickening heart of that being" (p. 123). This contradiction is inevitable "unless the logical consciousness reaches up to embrace the religious, and learns to state the absolute in terms of the absolute Ought" (p. 124). Such an ethical interpretation of Reality is indeed required to fill "the gap still remaining in the logic of science;" the real primacy of the moral reason means that "the reality of the scientific thinker as a moral being becomes the supreme condition and the demonstrating basis of science and of Nature itself, the world of the Vision Beatific becomes the one inclusive, all-grounding Fact, and a real God amid his realm of real Persons becomes the absolute reality" (pp. 126-127).

In his Supplementary Essay Professor Royce seeks "reconciliation rather than refutation," holding that "an argument concerning the grade of reality possessed by ethical individuals has its place in the development of an idealistic philosophy." "I shall try to show, not that Professor Howison is wrong in the stress which he lays upon the ethical importance of his individuals, but that the Absolute, as I

have ventured to define the conception, has room for ethical individuality without detriment to its true unity, or to the argument that I have advanced for its reality" (p. 137). The essay is a highly interesting, thoroughly fresh, and, in the present condition of the problem, not unimportant restatement of the idealistic position. It is divided into five parts, of which the first is little more than an introductory recapitulation of the earlier argument, and the fifth contains replies to the criticisms of the other symposiasts. In the other parts "the conception of will, and its relation to the Absolute," the "principle of individuation," and "the self-conscious individual" are in turn discussed.

The conception of God as the All-Knower is so far, Professor Royce admits, an extremely abstract conception. "One has every right to ask: Has the Absolute no other character than this? Does the Absolute only know? Or does he also will? Is our Absolute a purely theoretical being? Or does perfect knowledge imply more than mere knowledge?" (p. 185). Volition is attention, and attention is "sacrifice of ideal possibilities for the sake of realizing ideas. It is losing to win—losing bare abstractions to find concrete life. But the concrete life found is a life full of contrasting individuals, of sharply differentiated facts, of discrete realities. To the Absolute Experience, then, we should attribute just such a generalized form of the process that in us appears, clouded by countless psychological accidents, as the process of attention; just such an individuation of its contents, just such an attentive precision, whereby its universal types get discrete expression" (p. 201). "So, then, an Absolute Experience could and would at once find its ideas adequately fulfilled in concrete fact, and also find this fulfilment as an individual collection of individuals exemplifying these ideas, while, as to other abstractly possible fulfilments of the same ideas, the Absolute Experience would find them as hypothetical or ideal entities, contrary to fact" (p. 200).

Having thus found that "will individuates," Professor Royce proceeds to show that "individuation implies will," in the sense just explained. The antinomy of individuality seems complete. Individuality means uniqueness. "Thought, as such, cannot define uniqueness, and must appeal to experience; experience, as such, cannot present uniqueness, but must leave that, as being either an intelligible type or nothing, to thought" (p. 248). But the indefinableness of the individual, so far from proving its unreality, provides the clue to its nature as essentially ethical. "Man individuates the objects of his knowledge

because he is an ethical being. God individuates the objects of His own world, and knows them, for no other reason. . . . The Principle of Individuation, in us as in reality, is identical with the principle that has sometimes been called Will, and sometimes Love. Our human love is a good name for what first individuates for us our universe of known objects. We have good reason for saying that it is the Divine Love which individuates the real world wherein the Divine Omniscience is fulfilled" (p. 259). "It is not the object as presented, nor the object as thought, but it is the object as loved, which is such that there can be no other object consciously recognized as a fit representative of this type. . . . This practical, this passionate, this loving, this at first thoughtless dogma of love, 'There shall be no other,' is, I insist, the basis of what later becomes the individuating principle for knowledge" (p. 262). It is also the individuating principle of existence. Love, whether in man or in God, is essentially exclusive, and the Divine love implies the existence of a single world, and no other, as its object; it says, 'There shall be but this one world.' The conclusion is that "objects are individuals in so far as they are unique expressions of essentially exclusive ideals, ends, Divine decrees"—expressions, in short, of the Divine Will.

There is no conflict, according to Professor Royce, between the individuality of God, "the only ultimately and absolutely whole individual," and "the included variety, the relative freedom, the relative separateness, of the finite moral individuals, who, in their own grade of reality, are as independent of one another, in their freedom of choice, but also as dependent upon one another, in the interlinked contents of their lives, as the moral order requires. They are not, like the Absolute, whole individuals. . . . But the freedom of each finite moral individual is part of the Divine freedom—not an absolutely separate part, but a part having its own relative freedom—a differentiated element of this freedom itself. The uniqueness of each moral individual is a *part* of that which renders the Divine life, in its wholeness, unique. The self-consciousness of each finite individual is a portion of the Divine Self-Consciousness. The One Will of the Absolute is a One that is essentially and organically composed of Many. These many forms of will harmonize with the Whole, just by being, in a relative measure, free in respect one of another" (pp. 273-274).

After all the ingenuity and promise of the argument, this seems a disappointing result. Professor Howison could hardly have asked for a more perfect statement of his ethical objection to Professor Royce's monism than is contained in these sentences. One fails to see

in Professor Royce's final result any real advance upon the position of T. H. Green. Will is, after all, only 'appearance' in man, its 'reality' is the Will of God. Yet, according to Professor Royce, "a world of individuals more separate than this, more endowed with absolute caprice than this, would be a world of anarchy, no 'City of God,' but a moral hell" (p. 275).

Thus we find the two chief contributors to this philosophical symposium each occupying, at the end of it, the same position which he took at the beginning. Readers of the present discussion will await with much interest the appearance of the work in which Professor Howison promises to deal with the questions here stated "in their proper setting, in the system of philosophy to which they belong . . . the complete Idealism which maintains the mutually transcendent and still thoroughly knowable reality of God and souls," and in which "the true and continuously significant autonomy of Conscience is to be shown, as the really integrating factor in the theoretical consciousness itself" (pp. xxxiv.-xxxvi.).

JAMES SETH.